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ABSTRACT
In a labor market in which firms offer tied hours-wage packages and
there is substantial dispersion in the wage offers associated with a
particular type of job, the best job available to a worker at a point in
time may pay well but require an hours level which is far from the worker's
labor supply schedule, or pay poorly but offer desirable hours.
Intuitively, one would expect hours constraints to influence the pattern of
wage-hours tradeoffs which occur when workers quit to new jobs. Constrained
workers may be willing to sacrifice wage gains for better hours. Likewise,
workers may accept jobs offering undesirable hours only if the associated
wage gains are large. We investigate this issue empirically by examining
whether overemployment (underemployment) on the initial job increases
(reduces) the partial effect on the wage gain of a positive change in hours
for those who quit. We also examine whether overemployment
(underemployment) on the new job increases (reduces) the partial effect on
the wage gain of a positive change in hours for those who quit. Despite the
limitations imposed by. small sample sizes and lack of information on the
magnitude of hours constraints, our results support the view that an
individual requires compensation to work in jobs which, given the
individual's particular preferences, offer unattractive hours.
Joseph C. Altonji Christina H. Paxson
Department of Economics Woodrow Wilson School
Northwestern University Princeton University
Evanston, IL 60201 Princeton, NJ 08544I. INTRODUCTION
The broad concern of this paper is how tradeoffs between work hours and
wages are determined in the labor market. In the standard labor supply model,
a worker who finds a job paying a higher wage may choose to adjust his labor
supply. Since hours can be freely varied within jobs, the relationship between
hours changes and wage changes is determined by labor supply preferences.
However, there are a number of studies which argue that firms have strong
preferences about hours and place restrictions on the hours which an employee
may choose.1 Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981, 1984), Topel (1983) and Topel and
Murphy (1986) interpret hours of unemployment as constraints on the number of
hours worked, and investigate compensating differentials for unemployment risk
within a hedonic framework. In these models, workers choose among different
combinations of expected unemployment, unemployment risk and earnings in
accordance with a market locus.2 Rosen (1976), Lundberg (1984), Moffit (1984)
and Biddle and Zqrkin (1986) have investigated hours determination in hedonic
models in which workers trade off hours and wages in accordance with a market
locus. The wage change associated with any given hours change is a market
determined compensating differential. The preferences of a given individual
influence the optimal hours-wage combination which he selects, but do not
affect the wage associated with the particular hours level.
These hedonic models abstract from search costs and the fact that for a
given type of worker there is substantial dispersion in the wage offers
associated with a particular type of job. If wage and hours offers are tied,
but wages have a distribution around the market locus, workers will not
necessarily be on either their labor supply functions or on a market locus.
The best job available to the worker at a point in time may be one that pays
very well but requires an hours level that is far from the worker's labor2
supply schedule, or one that pays poorly but offers desireable hours.
Furthermore, when wage dispersion and search costs are added to a hedonic
market model, the wages received by workers in jobs offering a given hours
level will vary with the preferences of the workers. For example, one would
expect workers who wish to work part time but who have selected jobs requiring
full-time hours to receive, on average, a higher wage than equally productive
workers who prefer and have a full-time job. With search costs and wage
dispersion for a given hours level, individuals may still have to make
tradeoffs between wages and hours even if there is no systematic market
relationship between wages and hours.
The above discussion suggests that hours constraints should influence the
pattern of wage-hours tradeoffs which occur when workers quit. Intuitively, one
would expect that constrained workers may sacrifice wage gains for better hours
when changing jobs. In other words, the partial effect of a positive change in
hours by job changers who are overemployed (underemployed) on their initial
jobs should increase (reduce) the size of the wage gain required to induce a
quit. Also, since overemployment or underemployment on the new job influences
the attractiveness of the job, the partial effect of a positive change in hours
by job changers who are overemployed (underemployed) on their new job should be
to increase (reduce) the size of the wage gain associated with the quit.
In what follows, we provide a study of how hours constraints affect
hours-wage tradeoffs when workers change jobs. The empirical analysis
investigates how wage changes are affected by interactions among the change in
hours and indicators of overeniployment and underemployment on the old job and
the new job. We also use our results to provide an estimate of the compensated
labor supply elasticity.3
Section 2 discusses the implications of tied hours-wage offers withwage
dispersion for the tradeoff between hours changes and wage changes associated
with quits. We also compare our analysis to conventional labor supply studies
and studies such as Brown (1980) which have investigated whether there is a
compensating differential for hours levels and a number of other job
attributes. Section 3 discusses our sample of male heads of household from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. We
provide a brief summary in Section 5.
II. WAGE DISPERSION, HOURS CONSTRAINTS, AND HOURS-WAGE TRADEOFFS
We organize the discussion around the following simple model of job
choice in the presence of tied wage-hours offers and wage dispersion. Each job
is assumed to consist of a fixed hours-wage package. Furthermore, the
combination of hours and wages for a certain type of job may vary across firms,
due to differences in production technology, recruiting and turnover costs, and
other factors discussed in the references in footnote 1.
Because the hours level within each job is fixed, workers must change jobs
to change hours. It is assumed, however, that there is imperfect information
regarding the location of job opportunities. As a result, workers are not
always able to find jobs offering hours levels on their labor supply curves,
even though there may be vacancies for such jobs in the economy. Instead,
workers are assumed to obtain, at no cost, one offer each period. For a given
hours level the wages offered to a particular worker may vary across firms
because of matching, noncompetitive features of the labor market, and for a
number of reasons discussed in the "efficiency wage" literature. (See Parsons
(1984) and Katz (1986) for surveys of this literature.)
Thepreferencesof each worker are characterized by the function4
U(H,W;x).3 The variables H and W are the hours level and the real hourlywage
rate. The individual-specific vector x is a set of characteristics (e.g.
wealth, tastes for consumption and leisure, etc.) which affect the hours-wage
tradeoff. We assume that U11 <0,U22 <0and U2 >0.U1 is 0 at the desired
hours level. U1 is negative if the worker is overemployed and positive if the
worker is underemployed.
A worker will accept a job offer only if it provides a utility level which
exceeds that of the initial job by a mobility cost M, where M is measured in
utility units. That is, given initial hours and wages of H0 and W0, a job
offer H1, W1 will be accepted only if:
(1) CAIN(H1, W1, H0, W0; x) U(H1,W1;x) -U(H0,W0;x)￿ M.
The set of acceptable offers A(H0,W0;x) which satisfy (1) is depicted as
the shaded region in Figure 1. The solid curve U° represents the indifference
curve for an individual initially in a job with an hours-wage package of
[H0 ,W0'].The dashed indifference curve TJM defines the acceptance set and is
the locus of hours-wage combinations which provide the reservation utility
level of U(H0' ,W0' ;x) +Mrequired to induce a quit. The curve defines a
reservation wage function WM as a function of hours on the new job (H1). If
the initial hours level and wage are H0 and W0, WM is defined implicitly by:
(2) Gain(H1, WM, H0, W0; x) =U(Hl,WM;x)
-U(H0,W0;x)=M.
The line SS is the labor supply curve and shows the desired hours level
S(W;x) at each wage. In what follows, we define W'0 to be the wage which5
provides a utility level of U° when hours are equal to desired hours. S(W*0)
equals desired hours at W0. Likewise, W*M is the wage which provides a
utility level of uM when hours are equal to desired hours, and S(W*M) equals
desired hours at the wage W*M.
We use Figure 1 to make several points about tradeoffs between hours
constraints and wage gains associated with quits. First, suppose that hours
for both jobs lie on the labor supply curve SS. The vertical distance
(W*M -W*0)is the wage gain required to induce a quit when the initialwage is
and hours are on the labor supply curve in both jobs. If the marginal
utility of the wage is relatively constant over the range required to induce a
quit, then (W*M -W*o)is approximately equal to M/U2. Since the indifference
curves are flat in the neighborhood of S(W*o) and S(W*M), small deviations in
hours have little influence on the wage gain associated with a quit.
From the shape of the indifference curve U0, it is obvious that
substantial over or underemployment lowers the gap between W*M and the initial
wage relative to (W*M -W*0).For example, suppose that the initial job has an
hours-wage package of [H0',W0'], and that the job offer requires S(WM) hours.
In this case, the required wage gain is only (W*M -W01),which is obviously
** lessthan (W M -Wo)
Similar results hold if there are hours constraints in the new job. Since
uM is convex, the difference between the minimum acceptablewage offer WM and
is an increasing function of the distance between the required hours level
H1 and S(W*M). For example, the minimum acceptable wage offer associated with
a job with H1' hours is WM'. Due to the convexity of the indifference curve,
as H1' rises with respect to S(W*M), the wage gain which is required to induce
a quit also increases.6
In summary, this discussion suggests that the minimum wage gainrequired
to induce a quit is not sensitive to small amounts of over or underemployment,
but falls (rises) at an increasing rate with the absolute difference between
actual and desired hours on the old (new) job. One may derive a specific
equation with these properties by taking a Taylor expansion of
Gain(I-11,W1,H0,W0; x) around the point (S(W*M),W*M,S(W*O),W*o) up to second





In (3) the parameter 4= - . 51Jj/U2>0and we have imposed the assumption that
the second derivative U11 is constant over the relevant ranges. Since the





This equation says that after adjusting for the change in desired hours,
the effect of (H1 -H0)on (WM -W0)is a negative function of the amount of
initial underemployment. This result is intuitively obvious, since one would
expect that individuals who are underemployed would be willing to sacrifice
wage gains for additional hours, and would require extra large wage gains to
accept additional underemployment. The equation also says the effect of
(H1 -H0)on (WM -W0)is a positive (negative) function of the amount of7
overemployment (underemployment) in the new job.
The empirical specification actually used in the analysis differs from (4)
in several ways. First, (4) shows the relationship between the hours change
and the minimal wage change required to induce a quit. However, only W1 (the
actual wage obtained) is observed. We substitute W1 for WM in (4)4 Also, we
use the change in the log of the hourly wage rate as the dependent variable.
Second, we replace S(W*M)S(W*o), which is unobserved, with a constant.
Third, HoS(W*0) and H1S(W*M), the differences between actual and desired
hours in each period, are also unobserved. However, the data set does contain
information on whether the individual is under or over employed. Specifically,
we define the underemployment indicator UNDER and the overemployment indicator
OVERj for time period jas:
UNDER =1if (H -S)<oand UNDER =0otherwise, j=0,l
OVER 1 if (H -S)>0and OVERj 0 otherwise, j=O,l.
S,j is desired hours at the current wage, arid so Sj differs from S(W*).
However, because the indifference curves are convex, it is necessarily the case
that if the individual wishes to work more (less) at the current wage, he would
also wish to work more (less) at the wage W. Therefore, OVER and UNDER can
be used as indicators of whether {H -S(W*o)]and [H1 -S(W*M)Jare positive
or negative. We replace the terms [H0 -S(W*o)Jand [H1 -S(W*M)]with the
variables UNDER and OVER in equation (4).
Equation (4) restricts the effects of increases in hours to be the same as
the effects of reductions in hours. We do not always impose these restrictions
in the actual estimation. We create the variable IH.UPJ, which equals the8
changein hours given that the hours change is positive, and 0 if the change in
hours is negative. We also construct the variable JLH.D0WNI, which equals the
absolute value of the change in hours if the change in hours is negative, and 0
if the change in hours is positive. These variables are used in place of (H1-
H0) in equation (4).
We make additional modifications to (4) to reflect the implications of
other theories for the relationship between wage changes and hours changes.
Both the conventional labor supply model and the hedonic market model imply
that there will be a systematic relationship between hours and wage changes.
In order to control for the possibility that the relationship between hours
changes and wage changes is due to either movement along a labor supply
schedule or a market locus, we add (H1-H0) as a separate variable.5
In addition, the variables CON0 and CON1 are added to the equation, where
CON0andCON1 are dummy variables for whether workers were free to increase
hours on the initial job and on the new job. These variables are included
since firms which restrict hours choice may have to pay a compensating
differential to all workers, regardless of a whether the constraint is binding
for a particular worker. This issue has been examined by Duncan (1976).
Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct a variable for whether hours can
be reduced. Individuals who indicated that they wanted to work more but
couldn't were never asked whether they could work less.
Finally, we add a vector of variables (Z) to the model, where Z consists
of controls for education, experience, experience squared and cubed, race,
changes in marital status, changes in health status, and a set of year dummies.
The final equations estimated have the form:9





Theexpected signs for the parameters a01-a14are:a01<0, a02>0, O3>O, a04<O,
e11<0 a12>O, a13>0, l4<0. Basically, a change in hours that tightens the
constraint on the initial job should be associated with a larger wage gain, and
a change in hours that tightens the constraint on the new job should be
associated with a larger wage gain. Thus, individuals who reduce their hours
when they initially wanted to work more should have a larger wage gain (a03>O).
Likewise, individuals who increase their hours when moving into a job where
they want to work less should have larger wage gains (12>O). In some
specifications of the model, we impose the symmetry restrictions
a01=02=-a03=04, a11-a12=-a13a1.
Equation (5) pertains to quitters only. We actually estimate equation (5)
over the full sample of individuals who did and did not quit, with layoffs
excluded. However, we allow coefficients on all variables except for those in
Z to vary for quitters and stayers. Basically, we use the observations on
stayers to help identify the effects of the control variables such as education
and marital status. Use of the combined sample also enables us to compare the
effects of hours constraints on patterns of hours and wage changes for quitters
and stayers.
III. DATA
A sample of male heads of households was drawn from the 14 year (1968-
1981) Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Individuals Tape. Additional10
observations on these individuals for 1982 and 1983 were obtained from the
1968-1982 and 1968-1983 PSID tapes if the individual remained in the sample
after 1981.6 Observations for a particular year were excluded if the
individual was between the ages of 18 and 60, inclusive, and was not retired or
in school. Additional exclusions are discussed below.
The wage measure is the reported hourly wage at the survey date (typically
March) divided by the implicit price deflator for consumption expenditures.
This wage measure is available only from 1971 on for non-salaried workers, and
from 1976 on for salaried workers. The dependent variables for the regression
analysis is the change in the log of the wage rate, iln(wage) measured over a
two year time interval (i.e. tiln(wage) =1n(wage)
-ln(wage2)).The hours
measure used is reported hours/week worked on the main job in the calendar year
proceeding the survey. The change in hours variables !LH.UPI (change in hours
given that the change is positive) and EH.DOWNJ (absolute value of the change
in hours given that the change is negative) are also computed over two year
time intervals. The variableQUIT is a dununy variable signifying whether a
quit occurred in t-1.
Observations were excluded if total annual hours exceeded 5,000, the
absolute change in hours per week exceeded 45, the real wage in either t or t-2
was less than $.50 per hour, or if wage/wage2 was greater than 2.5 or less
than .4. Prior to 1978, hourly wages of over $9.98 were recorded as $9.98. We
excluded observations for which the wage in either t or t-2 was affected by
this upper bound.
Because we focus on hours-wage tradeoffs for quitters, observations were
excluded if a layoff occurred in time t-l. Observations were also excluded if
a separation occurred in time periods t or t-2. By eliminating these11
observations, we reduce the possibility that the hours measures reflect hours
worked in more than one job. We also insure that the wage measure (which is
the wage at the survey date, usually March) corresponds to the hours measure
(which refers to hours in the calendar year prior to the survey).7 The
resulting sample contains 12,711 observations. However, there are only 480
observations on quits.
The variables 0VER, UNDERj and C0N described in the previous section,
were constructed from a series of survey questions concerning the respondent's
satisfaction with work hours TJNDERj equals 1 if the individual indicated
that he would like to work more (and could not), and equals 0 otherwise. OVER
equals 1 if the respondent indicated that he would like to work less (and could
not) "even if [the respondent] earned less money". CON equals 1 if the
individual indicated that he could not work more at his job, regardless of
whether or not he wanted to work more. In the full sample, 60% reported an
upper constraint on hours (CON=l) 27% reported underemployment (UNDERl) and
only 6% report overemployment (OVER=l).9
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are reported
in Appendix Table Al.
IV. RESULTS
To provide readers with a feel for the overemployment and underemployment
variables OVER and UNDER in Table 1 we report descriptive Probit models
relating the overemployment and underemployment indicators 0VER and UNDERj to
the demographic variables used in the wage change analysis as well as to work
hours H. Not surprisingly, the results show that UNDER is negatively related
to and that OVERj is positively related to H. Another result worth noting12
is that, holding other variables constant, blacks are 5.8% more likely than
whites to report underemployment and 2.4% less likely to report
overemployment. 10
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the relationship among
OVERj
and UNDER the hours change, and the wage change for persons who quit. The
sample consists of the 480 observations on quits taken from the full sample
used in the regression analysis discussed below.
The patterns of hours changes for quits with over and underemployment in
the initial job are consistent with the notion that job changes are motivated
by the desire to change hours. Underemployed quitters have larger hours changes
than quitters initially satisfied with their hours; initially satisfied
quitters have larger hours changes than those initially overemployed. Another
finding is that the percentage of workers who are initially over or
underemployed falls from 36% on the initial job to 31.5% on the new job,
suggesting that on average mobility leads to more satisfactory work hours
Table2 also shows that individuals with initial hours constraints have, on
average, a higher wage change than individuals who are initially satisfied with
their hours: the average wage change is .087 when OVER0=l, .098 when UNDER0=l,
and .080 when both OVER0 and UNDER0 equal 0. Taken at face value, this result
is inconsistent with the implication of figure 1 that constraints on the
initial job lower the gap between the initial wage and the reservation wage.
The mean wage changes classified by constraints in the new job do not always
conform to expectations either. However, these results were obtained with no
controls for the effects of other variables on the wage change.1-2
We also report the covariance of the wage change and hours change for the
different constraint classifications. The discussion in the previous section13
predicts that this covariance will be larger when there is overemployment in
the new and old job, and smaller (more negative) when there is underemployment
in the new job and the old job. For the most part, this is what we find. We
now turn to the regression analysis.
The OLS estimates of variants of (6) are reported in Tables 3 and 413
As discussed above, the coefficients for all variables except for the controls
in the vector Z are allowed to vary for quitters and stayers. Table 3 shows
the parameter estimates for hours and constraint variables for quitters; Table
4 shows the corresponding estimates for stayers.
In both tables, we report conventional OLS t-statistics as well as
variants of the "White" t-statistics (See White (1984), pg. 143). The White t-
statistics account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation across
observations on the same individual but may be subject to larger sampling
variation. The White t-statistics are generally smaller. Unless stated
otherwise, we report OLS t-statistics in the text.
Column la presents a baseline equation which contains CON0, CON1, OVER0,
UNDER0, and the absolute value of positive and negative changes in hours. In
column 2a we add interactions among the hours changes and the variables UNDER0
and OVER0. In columns 3a we add OVER1, UNDER1, and interactions of the hours
changes and OVER1 and UNDER1.
The results may be summarized as follows:
1) Compensating Wage Differentials for Restrictions on Hours Increases
We find no evidence of compensating differentials for jobs which do not permit
workers to increase hours. The coefficients for CON0 and CON1 for quitters
have the wrong signs and are not statistically different from 0 at the 10%
level. These variables have the wrong sign and significant at the 10%14
level for workers who do not change jobs. Duncan and Holmlund (1983), using
Swedish data, obtained mixed results for a measure of inflexible hours.
2) Compensating Differentials for Hours Levels
Column la of Table 3 shows that there is a weak negative relation between
wages and hours when no constraints are taken into account: the coefficient of
IH.UPI is -.00004and the coefficient of IH.D0WNI is .00188. Neither is
statistically significant at the 10% level. If one interprets this as
indicative of the shape of the hours-wage locus in a hedonic market model, then
there seems to be only a weak negative tradeoff between the wage and hours per
week. Scaling up these coefficients by a factor as large as 5 to allow for
downward bias from measurement in the hours change would not alter this
conclusion very much. If one takes 40 hours per week as a base, then the point
estimates suggest that the hourly wage for a 30 hour per week job exceeds the
wage for a 50 hour per week job by about 1.9%. There is also a small and
negative (but statistically significant) relationship between the wage change
and the hours change for those who do not change jobs. Brown (1980) obtained a
similar finding. It should be kept in mind, of course, that these coefficients
do not identify an hours-wage locus if the conventional labor supply model
underlies hours-wage tradeoffs.
3) Effects of Overemployment and Underemtloyment on Hours-Wage Tradeoffs
Columns 2a and 3a of Table 3 show the effects of hours ctange-constraint
interactions for quitters. We expect to find that hours changes which loosen
(tighten) initial constraints to be associated with smaller (larger) wage
gains. Likewise, hours changes which loosen (tighten) constraints on the final
job should be associated with smaller (larger) wage gains. Despite the small
number of observations on quits and the likelihood of problems with the data on15
hours constraints, the results are qualitatively consistent with the theory
that workers trade off wage gains against the desirability of work hours when
changing jobs. However, many of the coefficients are imprecisely estimated,
and one hours-constraint interaction term (that of IH.D0WNIxUNDER1) has the
wrong sign.
Since we are stretching the data very thin by including four separate
interactions terms, we have also estimated the equation in column 2a with the
coefficients of iLH.UPlxOVERo, ILH.UPIXUNDERO, H.DOWNIxOVERo and
I iH.DOWNIxUNDERo constrained to be equal in absolute value. In terms of
equation 5, we define the parameter ao and restrict a0=a01-a02-a03=a04.The
estimate of the restricted parameter a0 is reported in column 2a of the
following text table:
Restricted Coefficients for Hours Change/Constraint Interactions
Parameters for Quitters
Restricted Esti-OLS White Esti- OLS White
Parameter matet-stat t-statmate t-stat t-stat
_____________________ (2a)(2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
ROW 1: a0 .0039 2.89 1.97 .0038 2.71 1.90
ROW 2: a1 .0021 1.50 1.05
Marginal Significance Levels (P-values) of x2 Tests
Tests: (Prob >x2) OLS x2 White x2
a0—Oanda1O: .005 .073
a0 =a1 .374 .498
Our estimate of the restricted coefficient a0 is .0039, and is statistically
significant at the 2.5% level using either the OLS and White t-statistics.
The equality restrictions easily pass a test (not reported in the table).
Given a mean hours level of approximately 43, the parameter estimate implies16
that constraints on the initial job change the wage elasticity with respect
to hours by .17.
We also estimated the model in column 3a after imposing the restriction
that all hours/constraint interactions on the initial job have coefficients
equal in absolute value, and all hours/constraint interactions on the final
job have coefficients equal in absolute value. In terms of equation 5, we
define the restricted parameters ao and a1 and set a0a01-a02-a03=a04 and
a1=a11=-a12=-a13=a14. These results are presented in column 3a of the text
table above. The parameter estimate a0 for the interaction of hours changes
and constraints on the initial job (ROW 1) is .0038(2.84); the estimate of
a1 for constraints on the final job is .0021(151). Both sets of
restrictions easily pass x2 tests. When we impose equality (in absolute
value) among all eight constraint interactions the resulting restricted
coefficient a equals .0030(3.13), and the restriction passes a x2 test with
a marginal significance level of .296. The parameter estimate indicates
that a one standard deviation change in hours which relaxes overemployment
or underemployment on the initial job or new job is associated with a 2.2%
reduction in the wage gain required to induce a quit.
Table 4 reports the coefficients of the hours and constraint variables
for stayers. In the theoretical discussion we assumed that hours and wages
were fixed within a given job. In reality, the preferences of workers and
employers vary over time. It is possible that firms may adjust the wage in
response to both changes in required hours and changes in the required hours
level relative to the preferred hours levels of particular workers. If this
is the case, one would expect find that hours constraints affect the
patterns of hours and wage tradeoffs within jobs. For example, workers who17
initially want to work less but cannot might be given larger raises if they
are required to work more in the second period. An alternative hypothesis
is that workers are sometimes offered new jobs with the same employer 'which
involve a different hours-wage package. If workers are not required to
accept such offers and if all hours changes within firms are associated with
job changes then one might expect our findings for stayers to be
qualitatively similar to our findings for quitters.
The evidence does not support either hypothesis. The coefficients on
the hours-constraint interactions for continuing jobs are estimated fairly
precisely but are small in magnitude. Five of the eight coefficients have
the wrong sign.
Estimates of the Compensated Labor Supply Elasticity
In this section we relate our estimates of a to the compensated
elasticity /3oflabor supply with respect to the wage. It is easy to show
that 3 is equal to [.5/(H)][W/I-IJ, whereis the parameter in (3) and (4).
This inverse relationship between the compensated labor supply elasticity /3
and the effects of hours constraints on reservation wages has been noted in
a number of previous studies (eg., Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981)).
We use the restricted parameter estimate of a, discussed above, to
obtain an estimate of the parameter 4whichappears in the elasticity.
Specifically, since the parameter a (of equation 5) was obtained by
replacing actual levels of hours constraints (in equation 4) with indicators
of hours constraints and by replacing the actual wage change with the change
in the log of the wage, one may interpret a as roughly equal to [/w] times
the mean absolute value of actual minus desired hours for individuals who
are constrained.1-4 Given an estimate of the average absolute difference18
between actual and desired hours, (denoted as IH-SI), together with the
estimate of a obtained in the regression analysis, it is possible to get a
rough estimate of the parameter q. The elasticity /3 can be estimated as:
/3 =[.5IH-SI/aHI/H.
To obtain an estimate of IH-SI ,wehave computed a weighted average of
the absolute values of the mean hours changes reported in Table 2 for
persons for whom OVER0=1 and UNDER1=OVER1=O, persons for whom UNDER0=1 and
UNDER1=OVER1=O, persons for whom OVER1=l and UNDER0=OVER0=O, and persons for
whom OVER1=l and UNDER0=OVER0=0. The estimate of IH-SI is 2.92. Since the
mean of hours is 43.25 and the estimate of a is .0030, the implied estimate
of /3 is .26.
This estimate is very rough and is calculated for illustrative purposes.
However, it worth noting that the estimate is not far above most estimates
for male household heads obtained in conventional labor supply analyses.
Many economists have speculated that estimates based on the conventional
labor supply methodology are seriously biased because they ignore
constraints; our calculations suggest that this is not necessarily the case.
Our results are also fairly similar to those of other studies which attempt
to account for underemployment or unemployment (see Ham (1982, 1986)). Our
estimates are in the same range as the estimate of .09 obtained by Abowd and
Ashenfelter (1981) and the estimates of .26 and .40 obtained by Murphy and
Topel (1986) in their analysis of compensating differentials.
Furthermore, our estimate of the elasticity is probably overstated.
Changes in desired hours due to preference changes and measurement error in
the hours change measure are likely to bias downward the coefficients on
various hours change variables in the regression, including the coefficients19
on the interactions with the constraints. This would bias the estimated
elasticity upward.15
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper examines how hours constraints affect the patterns of hours-
wage tradeoffs which result from job changes. The starting point of the
paper is the assumption that hours cannot be freely varied within jobs, and
that costs of mobility and imperfect information about job openings will
prevent workers from costlessly moving to jobs which offer hours-wage
combinations on the labor supply schedule or a market hours-wage locus.
Consequently, individual workers will tradeoff changes in attractiveness of
work hours against wage gains when changing jobs. Specifically, we examine
the hypothesis that the partial effect of a positive change in hours by job
changers who are initially overemployed (underemployed) is to increase
(reduce) the size of the wage gain required to induce a quit. Also, the
partial effect of a positive change in hours by job changers who are
overemployed (underemployed) in their new job is to increase (reduce) the
size of the wage gain.
Our empirical study is hampered by small sample sizes and lack of
information on the magnitude of hours constraints and other econometric
problems. It is encouraging that the results (in contrast to a number of
previous empirical studies of compensating differentials) are qualitatively
consistent with the theory, suggesting that additional research on hours-
wage tradeoffs associated with job mobility is warranted.1620
ENDNOTES
l.See Lewis (1969), Rosen (1969), Barzel (1973) and Deardorf and Stafford
(1976). There is also some empirical evidence to support the view that firms
place significant constraints on hours worked. Custmann and Steinmeir (1983,
1984) have shown that persons nearing retirement age must change jobs to reduce
hours. In Altonji and Paxson (1986), we show that hours for a given individual
are much more variable across time periods when the individual changes jobs
than across time periods in which the job does not change. One interpretation
of this result is that fixed hours requirements have a large influence on work
hours. Dickens and Lundberg (1985) analyze a labor supply model in which
workers choose among a finite number of job offers with the same wage but
different hours levels.
2.See also Ehrenberg and Schumann (1981), Ashenfelter (1980), Ham (1982, 1985),
and Rosen and Quandt (1976).
3.We assume that decisions are based on a one period utility function rather
than a multi-period utility function. The use of a multi-period model would
complicate the analysis considerably. One complication is that the
distribution g(H,W) may enter the valuation of a job offering H,W because it
affects the odds that a person will find a superior job. Furthermore,
expectations as to whether preferences are transitory or permanent will affect
the valuation of a current job offer. Kiefer (1984) analyzes a multi-period
search model of the labor market with fixed hours offers. However, Kiefer's
model does not distinguish between offers from the current firm and outside
offers. His framework is well suited for the analysis of transitions among
employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation, which is the focus of his
paper. With some major modifications, it might be possible to use Kiefer's
model to study transitions from one employer to another, which is our main concern.
4.The substitution of W1 for WM is only valid if the change in W1 (conditional
on H1 and Wl>WM) with respect to hours is a positive function of the change in
WM with respect to hours. This will always be true if the offers of H and W
are independent. However, if the hours wage offers are correlated (as would be
expected within a hedonic markets framework), it is possible that the
8E[W11H1, Wl>WM]/ÔH1 and 3WM/ÔH1 are opposite in sign. For example, suppose
that 3WM/8H1 is negative, but that H1 and W1 are positively correlated. A
larger hours offer will shift the mean of wage offers to a higher level. The
expected value of W1 conditional on Wl>WM could rise, despite the fact that the
lower bound for W1 has fallen. Since we have no information on the density
function g(H,W), this problem is ignored.
5.It is important to keep in mind that if labor supply preferences vary across
periods, then (under the null hypothesis of a standard labor supply model) the
hours change will be correlated with the error term of the wage change
equation. Measurement error in hours is likely to be severe and result in21
further biases.
6.We discovered after essentially completing this draft that due to a
programming error the 1982 and 1983 observations for blacks were excluded.
Restoring these observations rad. almost no effect on the results.
7.Note that if a separation occurred in the survey time period t-l, the
possibility still exists that Ht is a mixture of hours on more than one job.
Likewise, if a separation occurred in t-3, Ht..2 could be a mixture. We ignore
these problems since the use of observations for which the hours measure
unambiguously refers to hours on one job results in an excessive loss of
observations, particularly for individuals who quit.
8. The wording of the survey questions used to construct UNDER OVER and C0N
are as follows. CON equals 1 if the respondent answered "no" to "Was there
more work available on (your job/any of your jobs) so that you could have
worked more if you had wanted to?" UNDER was set to 1 if C0Nl and the
respondent answered "yes" to "Would you have liked to work more if you could
have found more work?" OVER was set to 1 if the respondent answered "no" to
"Could you have worked less if you had wanted to?" and "yes" to "Would you have
preferred to work less even if you earned less money?" Individuals for whom
UNDERj was set to 1 were never asked if they could work less, and so an
indicator of whether hours were downward flexible could not be constructed.
9. The wording of the question pertaining to overemployrnent may explain why
there are so few reports of overemployment. Some respondents may have
interpreted "even if you earned less money" as "even if your wage was lower",
rather than "even if your income was lower". Perhaps some individuals would
like to reduce hours at the current wage but would like to reduce hours at
a lower wage. This may be a source of measurement error in the overemployment
indicator.
lO.Additional information on UNDER may be found in Ham (1982), who reports a
probit equation relating UNDER to a variety of demographic and labor market
characteristics.
ll.We obtain results similar to these using a much larger sample which was not
restricted to persons for whom data on the wage change was available.
12. We also computed mean wage changes using annual earnings divided by annual
hours as the wage measure; the use of this wage measure makes it possible to
use a much larger sample. For this wage measure and the larger sample, the mean
wage change is -.0236when OVER0—l, .0310 when UNDER0=l, and .0377 when both
OVER0 and UNDER0 equal 0. These numbers are consistent with Figure 1. The
results for constraints on the new job are qualitatively the same for the large
and small samples.
l3.We use ordinary least squares to estimate the model despite the fact that
the change in hours will be correlated with the error term of (6) as a result
of measurement error in hours or if hours are in fact chosen by workers. This
would bias the coefficients of the change in hours variables and affect the
interactions of hours changes with the constraint indicators. If one takes the
labor supply model as the null hypothesis, then determinants of wage offers22
across jobs might be used as instrumental variables for the hours change and
constraint variables. However, the PSID does not contain sufficient
information on determinants of wage offers to attempt such a procedure,
especially given that the analysis is conducted in first differences and that
the instruments would have to be sufficient to identify the effects of several
hours change and constraint variables. Murphy and Topel (1986) and Solon (1986)
discuss econometric issues relevant to the use of first difference wage models
to examine compensating differentials.
14. This may be seen more clearly by rewriting (4) as:
WM-WOK1 +4(H1-H0)[IHo-Sol(0VERO-UNDERO) +Hi-SiI(OVERl-UNDER1)]
where K1 represents all other terms in the equation. Assuming that the
average absolute difference between actual and desired hours is roughly the
same in each period, one can replace the two variables IHj-SiI (j=O,1) with









It is clear from these last two equations that a may be interpreted as
approximately IH-Sk/W.
15. We do have some limited evidence on the importance of measurement error.
For a sample of workers who are paid by the hour, we are able to construct
an alternative measure of hours per week by dividing labor earnings by the
product of weeks worked on the main job and the reported hourly wage. The
questions used to construct these variables are independent of the question
about hours per week on the main job, and so we use the covariance of the
alternative hours measure with the reported hours per week as an estimate of
the variance of the change in hours per week. For stayers and quitters who
were paid by the hour, the variances in the change in reported hours per
week are 31.74 and 95.5, while the covariances of the two hours change
measures are 15.6 and 82.3. This evidence suggests that measurement error
might account for 13.8% of the variance in (Hi -HO)for quits. If one were
to adjust all coefficients involving this variable by (95.5/82.3), one would
obtain a corrected estimate of a of .0035 and a corrected estimate of 9 of
.224.
16. A serious omission of our study is the failure to consider hours on
other jobs. It would also be useful to distinguish among jobs which permit
workers to vary hours, jobs which require fixed hours, and jobs in which the
required hours vary over time, perhaps using industry or occupation proxies
as in Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) and Murphy and Topel (1986). It would be
useful to extend the analysis to other panel data sets (such as the Negative
Income Tax data and the Quality of Employment Survey) which contain
information on hours constraints. However, a definitive analysis of the23
role of hours constraints in job mobility and hours-wage tradeoffs will
require a new data collection effort. Ultimately, it would be desireable to
provide a joint analysis of labor supply, employer determination of hours,
the mobility decision and the tradeoff between hours and wage changes.REFERENCE S
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PROB II IQJAI' I ONS —D1;TERNINANTS UF hOURS CONST RA I NI'S
(t—stat isLics i.upirel1thI('ses)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: UNDER (1 if underemployed) OVER (1 if overernployed)
PARTIAL EFFECT PARTIAL EFFECT
PARAMETER ON PROBABILITY PARAMETER ON PROBABILITY SAMPLE
ESTIMATE AT SAMPLE MEAN ESTIMATE AT SAMPLE MEAN MEANS
(la) (ib) (2a) (2b) (3)
INTERCEPT 2.01 .627 -2.306 -.2459
(16.15) (14.34)
OLDER (1 if -.0281 -.0088 -.0538 -.0057 .105
age >55) (.45) (.63)
RACE (1 if .1843 .0575 -.2216 -.0236 .309
black) (6.63) (4.79)
MARRIED (1 .0832 .0259 -.1113 -.0119 .889
if married) (2.09) (1.92)
DISABLED (1 .0091 .0028 .0346 .0037 .079
if health (.20) (.52)
limitation)
EDUCATION -.0864 -.0269 -.00055 -.00006 11.66
(18.39) (.08) (3.09)
EXPERIENCE -.0028 -.0009 -.0153 -.0016 19.32
(.49) (1.83) (10.71)
EXPERIENCE2 -.00038 -.00012 .00054 .00006 488.14
(2.62) (2.57) (469.90)




PROB >F .1E-6 .1E-6
*12,711 observations. 26.1% of the sample reports UNDER =1.5.6% of the sample



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Means and Standard Deviations










UNDER0 0.51672.6229 0.48362.4386 1.36255.4739
IH.UPI
OVER0 0.34082.0175 0.33792.0038 0.41452.3416
IH.D0WNI
UNDER0 0.07750.9542 0.07310.8756 0.18952.1381
I.D0WNI x








OVER1 0.08390.9622 0.08300.8955 0.10622.0226
STD.DEV MEAN STD.DEV
QUIT 0.03770.1906
t1n(wage) 0.03140.1850 0.02920.1781 0.08570.3084
CON0 0.61050.4876 0.61120.4874 0.59370.4916
CON1 0.60650.4885 0.60770.4882 0.57500.4948
UNDER0 0.26260.4400 0.26150.4394 0.28950.4540
OVER0 0.05600.2299 0.05540.2288 0.07080.2568
UNDER1 0.26070.4390 0.26080.4390 0.26040.4393
OVER1 0.05600.2299 0.05600.2300 0.05410.2265
FH.UPI 1.71964.4256 1.62504.2024 4.12917.9210
I1H.D0WNI 1.78234.3163 1.74714.2366 2.67915.9364
IH.UPI
OVER1
IAH.D0WNI
UNDER1